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This paper proposes an estimate of the extent of opportunity
inequality and of its determinants in a sample of European
countries, based on the Survey on Income and Living Conditions
conducted in 2005. Although the ranking among Northern
European and Mediterranean countries is generally respected, our
measures of equality of opportunity provide a different ranking with
respect to the one offered by the measures of overall income
inequality. Our figures show that equality of opportunity has
correlation with both institutional measures of schooling (pre-
primary education, de-tracked secondary school) as well as with
labour market institutions (union density, but not employment
protection). [JEL Classification: D31, D63, J62]
Keywords: inequality of opportunity, income inequality,
intergenerational mobility.
Questo lavoro propone una stima della disuguaglianza delle
opportunità e delle sue determinanti in un campione di paesi eu-
ropei utilizzando i dati della Indagine Europea sul Reddito e le
Condizioni di Vita (Survey on Income and Living Conditions) del
2005. Sebbene l’ordinamento fra paesi nordici e paesi mediterranei
sia generalmente rispettato, le nostre misure di uguaglianza delle
opportunità forniscono un ordinamento diverso rispetto a quello
delle misure di disuguaglianza complessiva del reddito. La nostra
indagine inoltre evidenzia che l’uguaglianza delle opportunità è cor-
relata sia con caratteristiche istituzionali che misurano il grado di
scolarizzazione (tasso di iscrizione alla scuola materna, stratifica-
zione nella scuola secondaria) sia con caratteristiche strutturali del
mercato del lavoro (importanza del ruolo dei sindacati piuttosto
che di meccanismi di tutela dell’occupazione).
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1. - Introduction
This paper proposes an estimation of the extent of opportunity
inequality in Italy and in other 23 European countries. In Italy
the theme is quite important, given the low level of
intergenerational social mobility and the geographical differences
in the measure inequality of opportunities between North and
South of the country. The evidence we propose, in addition to be
interesting per se, if one believes that equality of opportunity is
the “right” theory of distributive justice, may also have an
instrumental value: it might help to understand the genesis of
standard income inequality; it may help to identify the priorities
of a redistributive public intervention; finally, it could help
identifying cases of inequality traps (World Bank, 2006) which, by
preventing social groups from their full participation into
economic and social life, might be partially responsible for the
poor performance of some economies.
In this paper we refer to the conceptualization of EOp
proposed by philosophers such as Dworkin (1981a, 1981b); Arneson
(1989); Cohen (1989) and explored within the economic literature
– initiated by Roemer (1993, 1998) and Fleurbaey (1995) – that has
flourished in the last two decades and that has analyzed different
ways in which the concept of equality of opportunity may be
translated in formal economic models (see Fleurbaey, 2008 for a
survey). More specifically, our contribution, which is both
theoretical and empirical, is devoted to the issue of measuring
opportunity inequality.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we first
provide a methodology to both measure opportunity inequality
and decompose overall income inequality into two components:
income inequality due to initial inequality in opportunities and
income inequality due to individual responsibility. Secondly, we
apply this methodology to measure opportunity inequality in Italy
and in other 23 European countries and make an attempt to
correlate the extent of opportunity inequality to institutional
measures in such countries.
A common feature of the EOp literature is the basic idea that
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2008
266
11-Checchi (II)_265_294  10-12-2009  10:53  Pagina 266
individuals’ outcomes arise from two classes of variable: variables
for which they should not be held responsible for (circumstances)
and variables which belong to the sphere of individuals’
responsibility (effort). Once this basic partition has been made, the
concept of EOp can be decomposed into two distinct ethical
principles: the Compensation Principle, which states that differences
in outcomes due to circumstances are ethically inacceptable and
should be compensated; the Reward Principle, which takes the view
that differences due to effort are to be considered ethically
acceptable and do not need any intervention.
The existing literature has developed different approaches to
measuring opportunity inequality. The analysis starts with
partitioning the population in circumstance classes (types), where
each class is formed by individuals endowed with the same set of
circumstances: the income distribution within a circumstance
class is interpreted as the opportunity set open to individuals in
that class. Hence, in order to measure opportunity inequality, one
focuses on the inequality between types inequality.
In some cases the existence of EOp in a given distribution is
tested by checking for stochastic dominance between the types
distributions, as in the studies by Lefranc et al. (2006a; 2006b) and
Peragine and Serlenga (2008). Other studies propose opportunity-
egalitarian social welfare functions to obtain partial rankings of
income distributions (see Van de Gaer, 2003 and Peragine, 1998,
2004 on the theoretical side; Peragine and Serlenga, 2008 for an
empirical application). Finally, some authors use inequality indices
to obtain complete rankings of income distributions (see
Bourguignon et al., 2003; Checchi and Peragine, 2009; Dardanoni
et al., 2005; Ferreira and Gignoux, 2008; Pistolesi, 2007). Studies
which use this third methodology can be further distinguished
depending on the empirical estimators they use. Bourguignon et al.
(2003); Dardanoni et al. (2005) and Pistolesi (2007) estimate EOp
by using parametric models, while Checchi and Peragine (2009) use
a non parametric method for their estimations. Recently, Ferreira
and Gignoux (2008) compare parametric and non parametric
methodologies, following the model proposed by Bourguignon et al.
(2007). Each approach has pros and cons: the non parametric
models avoids the arbitrary choice of a specific functional form on
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the relationship between outcome, circumstances and effort; on the
other hand, parametric models allow to study partial effects of
circumstances on outcome, other things constant (i.e. they make it
easier building and studying counterfactuals).
In this paper we focus on complete rankings of opportunity
inequality and explore both the parametric and the non parametric
methodologies1. Furthermore, once an estimation of EOp
measures is derived, we study the correlation between institutional
characteristics and the opportunity inequality ranking for the
countries under consideration.
The empirical application is therefore divided in two parts.
First, along with the standard measures of inequality, we provide
estimates of income inequality and opportunity inequality in 24
European countries available in the EU-SILC database. The purpose
here is to rank European countries with respect to EOp by using
both parametric and non parametric measures. Second, we focus
on institutional characteristics that might influence the degree of
opportunity inequality in the countries under analysis. Although the
intuitive ranking among Northern European and Mediterranean
countries is generally respected (with the formers exhibiting more
EOp than the latter), our measures of equality of opportunities
provide a different ranking with respect to the one offered by the
measures of overall income inequality. Our figures also show that
equality of opportunity is positively correlated with pre-primary
education and de-tracked secondary school systems. Equality of
opportunity is also positively associated to labour market regulation,
to union density and to wage centralization whereas is positively
related to fiscal redistribution. The paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces our methodology for measuring opportunity
inequality and decomposing overall income inequality. Section 3
contains our empirical analysis: the data description, the estimating
procedure and the discussion of the results. Section 4 concludes
with some final remarks and some directions for future research.
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2. - Measuring Opportunity Inequality: A Simple Model
Each individual in our society is completely described by a
list of traits, which can be partitioned into two different classes:
the first class includes traits beyond the individual responsibility,
represented by a person’s set of circumstances c. The individual
sets of circumstances belong to a finite set Ω = {c1, …, cn}.
Circumstances include a vast list of income generating inputs that
are out of control of the individual, like gender, age, ethnicity,
region of residence or parental background: various notions of
equality of opportunity correspond to different choices of which
of these variables are to be regarded as circumstances. In the
sequel, or semplicity of exposition, we will treat only gender and
parental education as circumstances. If the only circumstances are
gender, which can only take values in the set {male, female}, and
parental education, that only takes values in the set {graduate
parents, non graduate parents}; in this case the set Ω would be
the following:
The second class includes factors for which the individual is
fully responsible and is represented by a scalar variable, effort, e
∈ Θ. We assume that effort is one-dimensional. It is important to
stress that by effort in this paper we mean not only the extent to
which a person exerts himself, but all the other background traits
of the individual that might affect his success, but that are
excluded from the list of circumstances. This amounts to say that
any other factors, as native ability, talent, luck, and so on, are
implicitly classified as within the sphere of individual
responsibility. This assumption may lead us to overestimate the
portion of inequality which is ethically acceptable2.
Income is generated by a function g: Ω × e Θ → +, that assigns
individual incomes to combinations of effort and circumstances:
 
Ω =
{female, non graduate parents},{female, graduate parents}
{male, non graduate parents},{male, graduate parents}
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ .
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x = g(c, e)
To save notation, we may also write x (c, e) and refer to it as
both the individual income and the relevant income distribution.
Hence, this is a pure deterministic model, where for any given
existing circumstances all variations in individual income are
attributed to personal effort. We therefore deviate from standard
Mincerian models of income generation, where incomes are
explained by circumstances, proxies for effort and a random
component which is typically assumed to be i.i.d. In our analysis,
the individual is held responsible for any random component that
may affect his/her income (included native ability or talent, as long
as they are not included in the set of circumstances).
Effort is unobservable. Unobservable is also the function g,
hence we do not make any assumption about the degree of
substitutability or complementarity among the circumstances in
order to keep the approach as general as possible. We assume,
however, that the function g is fixed and identical for all
individuals. Moreover, we introduce two basic assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 1 The function g is monotoni cally increasing in
effort e
ASSUMPTION 2 The distribution of effort e is independent of the
circumstances.
Assumption 1 is fairly reasonable. Assumption 2 appears to
be more problematic, given the non observability of effort. From
a theoretical point of view it would be hardly sustainable to hold
people accountable for the factor e, were it dependent on external
circumstances. However, from the empirical point of view, there
are income determinants that are clearly the joint outcomes of
effort and circumstances. Typical is the case of acquired education,
which is the result of parental background (educated parents are
typically richer in monetary and cultural resources) but also
requires personal effort (in order to afford the psychological costs
of studying). Since income is correlated with education, this would
violate our Assumption 2. In such a case, we would be forced to
extend the requirement of orthogonality between circumstances
and effort to all these “intermediate” variables (where we could
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2008
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add labour market participation, fertility choices, migration, and
similar). For this reason, we consider Assumption 2 to be the
simplest property compatible with the empirical non parametric
application that we adopt in the next section.
For ci ∈ Ω, we call type i the set of individuals whose set of
circumstances is c. The type income distribution represents the
set of outcome levels which can be achieved – by exerting different
degrees of effort – starting from the same circumstance ci. That
is to say, the type distribution is a representation of the opportunity
set – expressed in outcome terms – open to any individual
endowed with circumstances ci.
We propose the following definition of equality of opportunity.
DEFINITION There is EOp if the set of opportunities is the same,
regardless of the circumstances. Inequality of opportunity decreases
if inequality between individual opportunity sets decreases.
Thus, this definition puts special emphasis on the differences
in the outcome prospects for classes of individuals with identical
circumstances. Accordingly, it focuses on inequality between types,
and is instead neutral with respect to inequality within types.
Hence, in the model introduced the measure of opportunity
inequality in a distribution is given by the degree of inequality
between types. To capture such inequality we may construct an
hypothetical smoothed distribution obtained after the following
transformation:
x (c, e) → x (c, e–)
where x (c, e–) is the artificial distribution obtained by using a
constant reference value of effort e–.
Hence, inequality of opportunity is given by a (scale invariant)
inequality index I applied to the distribution x (ci, e
–)
OI = I(x(c, e–))
or, in relative terms:
 
OI
I x e
I x erelative
=
( )( )
( )( )
c
c
,
,
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The meaning of x (ci, e
–) depends on the specific measurement
approach one decides to adopt.
In a non parametric descriptive approach x (c, e–) can be repre-
sented by the average income3 of a given type identified by c (call
it μc. If we opt for a non parametric approach, then for any path
independent measure of inequality4 (Foster and Shneyrov, 2000)
we have that
The interpretation is as follows: by measuring the inequality
in the artificial vector μc, obtained by replacing each income with
its type mean income, we only capture the between types
inequality, which, in turn, reflects the opportunity inequality. On
the other hand, by rescaling all type distributions until all types
have the same mean income, hence obtaining the distribution 
, we are left with an income vector in which the only
inequality present is th within types inequality, to be interpreted
as inequality due to individual responsibility. Hence the
decomposition above can be interpreted as:
total inequality = within types + between types
total inequality = effort inequality + opportunity inequality
Thus, we have a measure of opportunity inequality and a
decomposition of overall inequality into an ethically acceptable
and an ethically offensive part.
 
x e
c
c,( )
μ
 
I x e I
x e
x e
I x e
I x
c
c
,
,
,
,
,
( )( ) = ( )( )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ + ( )( )
c
c
c
e I
x e
I
c
c( )( ) = ( )⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ + ( )
c,
μ
μ
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tranche identified by e.
4 In particular, we need to use the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD), which
is the only index which has a path-independent decomposition using the arithmetic
mean as the representative income. For a distribution X = (x1, …, xN) with meanμx the MLD is defined as:
 
MLD X
N x
X
ii
N( ) =
=
∑1
1
ln
μ
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Inequality of opportunity by the ex ante approach can also be
computed parametrically5. In this case we need to estimate the
following relationship for the whole population such that
derive the following counterfactual distribution xˆi = exp(βˆci).
Hence, inequality of opportunity in the parametric case will be
given by
In the following empirical analysis we will compare our
estimates OI (parametric and non parametric) and use them for
our an analysis of relationship between the extent of opportunity
inequality and some relevant policy or institutional variables.
3. - The Empirical Analysis: Income Inequality
and Opportunity Inequality in Europe
3.1 Data Description
We use data from the 2005 wave of the European Survey on
Income and Living Conditions (EUSILC) which is annually
conducted by the national Central Statistics Offices (CSOs) in
order to obtain information on the income and living conditions
of different household types. The survey contains information on
a large number of individual and household characteristics as well
as specific information on poverty and social exclusion.
Representative random samples of households throughout a large
number of European countries are approached to provide the
required information. We consider 24 countries in our analysis,
namely Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain,
Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy,
Luxemburg, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.
 
I xiˆ( )
 ln x ci i i= +β ε
273
5 This is the approach followed by FERREIRA F.H.G. and GUIGNOUX J. (2008).
Income Inequality, etc.D. CHECCHI - V. PERAGINE - L. SERLENGA
11-Checchi (II)_265_294  10-12-2009  10:53  Pagina 273
Differently from other sources of data, EUSILC provides a
common data source with comparable individual and household
level micro-data on income and living conditions in the EU
countries, allowing for significant improvements in the
comparability of countryspecific measures. EUSILC is expected to
become the EU reference source for comparative statistics on
income distribution and social exclusion at European level.
Indeed, our study has became possible because the 2005 EUSILC
includes a special data module which provides information for
attributes of each respondent’s parents during her childhood
period in the age 14-16. This additional module reports family
composition, number of siblings, the educational attainment,
occupational as well as the labour market activity status of each
respondent’s mother and father and the presence of financial
problems in household. In what follows parental education is
measured by the highest educational attainment in the couple of
parents. Individuals are therefore divided in three groups: group
1 refers to individuals having both parents with no education; 2
corresponds to individuals who have at least one of the parents
with primary or secondary (lower and upper) school degree, while
group 3 corresponds to individuals who have at least one of the
parents with post-secondary or tertiary degree. Parental
occupation is also divided in three categories: category 1
corresponds to individuals having both parents occupied as plant
and machine operator and assembler or in elementary occupations
(groups 8,000 and 9,000 according to the 15C088 classification);
category 2 refers to individuals who have at least one of the
parents occupied as service worker, shop and market sales worker,
skilled agricultural and fishery worker or as craft and related
trades workers (groups from 5,000 to 7,000 of the 1SC088
classification); finally, category 3 refers to individuals who have at
least one of the parents occupied as legislator, senior official,
manager, professional, technician, associate professional or clerk
(groups from 1,000 to 4,000 of the ISCO88 classification).
In the empirical analysis we also consider some additional
individual characteristics as circumstances. This set comprehends
gender, nationality (distinguishing those who declare the country
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2008
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of birth to be the same of the country of residence) and
geographical location (distinguishing people living in densely
populated area form others).
We restrict the sample to individuals working full-time or part-
time, unemployed and those fulfilling domestic tasks and care
responsibilities aged between 30 and 60.6 Our reference variable
is post-tax individual income which is available for 17 out of 24
countries under analysis, for the remaining ones we derived net
income information from gross income by imputing the tax rate
in 2004.7 Being aware of the fact that welfare indicators estimated
from micro-data can be very sensitive to the presence of extreme
incomes (Cowell and Victoria-Feser, 1996a, 1996b, 2002) we
censored the countries’ income distributions by dropping the very
extreme values.8 Tables 9 and 10 in the Appendix show summary
statistics of both individual and parental characteristics.
3.2 Income and Opportunity Inequality Ranking in Europe
In this section we aim to rank European countries with
respect to EOp using both the parametric and non parametric
approaches.
Starting with the estimates of overall income inequalities, we
notice that the ranking based on calculation of Gini index from
our data is quite consistent with the ranking provided by OECD
and Eurostat (see Table 1 and Graph 1).9 In particular our
evidence shows that formerly planned economies (Poland, Latvia,
275
6 We exclude pupils, students, those in an unpaid work experience, those in
retirement or in early retirement, permanently disabled or/and unfit to work, those
in compulsory military community or service and other inactive person.
7 Tables 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 in the APPENDIX show the progressive tax rate used
for the conversion. As for Slovakia we imputed a flat tax rate of 19% (source:
http://www.finance.gov.sk/) whereas for Iceland a tax rate of 37.7% has been imputed
for imcome higher than 1.191.000 ISK (source: http: //www.ministryoffinance.is).
8 VAN KERM P. (2007) discusses how ordinial comparisons of countries are
found to be robust to variants of data adjustment procedures such as trimming
arid wimisorizing.
9 Spearman rank correlation between EUSILC Gini and the ones calculated
by OECD and Eurostat are 0.90 and 0.84, respectively.
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Lithuania, Estonia plus Portugal) obtain the highest values of both
Gini and MLD. They are followed by the UK, Ireland and
Mediterranean countries like Greece, Italy and Spain whereas
Northern countries like Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden
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TABLE 1
INEQUALITY OF INCOME AND COMPARABLE GINI CALCULATIONS
country OECDGini
EUROSTAT
Gini
EUSILC
Gini
EUSILC
Mld
AT 0.27 0.26 0.275 0.164
BE 0.27 0.28 0.266 0.145
DE 0.3 0.26 0.29 0.185
DK 0.23 0.24 0.217 0.083
EE 0.344 0.243
ES 0.31 0.32 0.314 0.216
FI 0.27 0.26 0.271 0.136
FR 0.28 0.28 0.285 0.163
GR 0.31 0.33 0.316 0.2
HU 0.3 0.28 0.305 0.161
IE 0.32 0.32 0.296 0.187
IS 0.29 0.25 0.279 0.188
IT 0.35 0.33 0.309 0.197
LT 0.356 0.228
LU 0.26 0.26 0.276 0.148
LV 0.357 0.229
NL 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.184
NO 0.28 0.28 0.262 0.145
PL 0.38 0.36 0.364 0.271
PT 0.38 0.38 0.354 0.247
SE 0.24 0.23 0.231 0.106
SI 0.239 0.104
SK 0.27 0.26 0.278 0.132
UK 0.34 0.34 0.319 0.204
Note: EUSILC Gini arid MLD are given by authors’ calculations; OECD Gini on working age
population and Eurostat Gini are taken from http://stats.oecd.org and OECD (2008).
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lead the ranking with low values of both Gini and Mean
Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) (see Graph 2). Turning to the
measurement of inequality of opportunity, our attention is
confined to the MLD which is the only index that allows for a
perfect decomposition of total income inequality in effort
inequality and opportunity inequality. As a first insight we notice
that inequality of opportunity generally accounts for a substantial
share of income inequality in the EU countries under analysis, see
Table (2). Notice that both the Netherlands and Norway have very
few observations on parental socio-economic background, hence
results in those cases might not be fully interpreted (see Tables 9
and 10). Summary statistics on the characteristics of the sample
also show that we could not take into consideration information
on degree of urbanization for the Netherlands and Slovenia
277
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GRAPH 1
CORRELATION BETWEEN EUSILC GINI AND
OECD GINI ON WORKING AGE POPULATION
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Gini measures according to different data sources
Gini OECD Gini EUSILC
Source: Authors’ calculations and http://stats.oecd.org.
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whereas in the case of Sweden, given few observations available
on parental occupation, we choose not to consider this
characteristic.10 Inequality of opportunity explains from the 2% to
the 22% of income inequality. As mentioned in the previous
section, given the partial observability of circumstances, those
values can only be considered as lower bound estimates. Table (2)
shows the ranking obtained by absolute measures, also reporting
the incidence on total inequality).
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GRAPH 2
CORRELATION BETWEEN EUSILC GINI AND
EUSILC MLD ON WORKING AGE POPULATION
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It is interesting to note that country ranking based on
inequality of opportunities does not coincide with the picture
emerging when looking at total inequality (see Graph 3). Countries
that were characterised by high levels of total inequality (Poland,
Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia) show that only a small fraction of
it was due to the effect of circumstances, indicating that most of
it may be due to individual unobservable components (within
which individual effort). A second pattern is observed among
Nordic countries (notably Sweden, Denmark and Finland, with
Norway partially apart), which report low level of both total
279
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TABLE 2
INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN ABSOLUTE
AND AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INEQUALITY
country absolute relative
AT 0.037 0.396
BE 0.023 0.372
DE 0.03 0.27
DK 0.01 0.241
EE 0.021 0.272
ES 0.038 0.329
FI 0.012 0.169
FR 0.017 0.258
GR 0.026 0.27
HU 0.007 0.211
IE 0.032 0.337
IS 0.023 0.372
IT 0.024 0.305
LT 0.016 0.215
LU 0.026 0.311
LV 0.02 0.214
NL 0.033 0.38
NO 0.025 0.276
PL 0.017 0.207
PT 0.022 0.312
SE 0.011 0.189
SI 0.002 0.135
SK 0.014 0.242
UK 0.037 0.314
Note: The columns refer to MLD in absolute terms and as percentage of total inequality as
measured by MLD.
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inequality and inequality of opportunities. Finally, most of the
continental Europe and the Mediterranean area gather in an
intermediate situation, with average inequality but high impact of
circumstances. For these reasons we wonder whether these
patterns could be associated to institutional features existing in
these countries, which is the argument of the next section.
3.3 Accounting for Opportunity Inequality
While searching for institutional features which may attenuate
the impact of circumstances on income formation, we were
induced to look at two passages which are crucial in individual
careers: schooling and entrance in the labour market. As far as
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GRAPH 3
OPPORTUNITY INEQUALITY AND TOTAL INEQUALITY
AT
BE
DE
DK
EE
ES
FI
FR
GR
HU
IEIS
IT
LT
LU
LV
NL
NO
PL
PT
SESI
SK
UK
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
E
U
S
IL
C
 m
ea
n
 lo
ga
ri
th
m
ic
 d
ev
ia
ti
on
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
fraction of inequality attributable to circumstances
Inequality of opportunity and total inequality (MLD)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
11-Checchi (II)_265_294  10-12-2009  10:53  Pagina 280
the first dimension, the literature suggests that early schooling
may contribute to reducing the role of parental background in
competence formation (Cunha and Heckman, 2007). In addition,
the stratification of the educational system may reinforce the
impact of parents’ education, since low educated parents may
prevents their kids from aspiring to more academic oriented
careers (Brunello and Checchi, 2007). The quality of education
may also play a role, since it may compensate the disadvantage
of students coming from poor environment. Unfortunately, data
on school quality are not easily available (unless one is ready to
consider students achievements as a proxy for “revealed” quality).
More modestly, we have considered economic resources publicly
invested in the educational system as proxies for quality of
education. In Graph 4 and Graph 5 we report the scatter plots of
inequality of opportunities against some of these measures. In the
left panel of Graph 4 we show that the ratio of enrolment in
preprimary education over primary enrolment (a rough indicator
of preprimary participation, in the absence of good quality data
on the relevant age cohort for preprimary education11) is
negatively correlated with IO. Similarly, the right panel of the
same Figure shows that a larger fraction of students enrolled in
vocational education (another proxy for the extent of school
stratification12) enhances the IO. When considering the resources
available to the educational system, we have included in the left
panel of Graph 5 the ratio of students to teachers in primary
school (a negative proxy for resources – we were forced to use
primary education, as it was the only variable which was non
281
11 Source: OECD online database (http: //www.oecd .org/education/database).
Data are referred to 2002, and are obtained from BRUNELLO G. and CHECCHI D.
(2007). The enrolment in preprimary schooling of 4-year-old children made
available from Eurostat with reference to 2005 was discarded because it was
reporting values at 100% for some countries, contradictimig the figures contained
in Education at a glance from OECD.
12 Data from Eurostat 2005 (http : //epp.eurostat .ec .europa.eu/portal/page/portal/
statistics/search database). This indicator provides information on the percentage
of boys and girls in upper secondary education who are enrolled in the vocational
stream. It is indicative in the importance of initial vocational education and
training in a country, taking into account also the gender dimension.
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GRAPH 4
OPPORTUNITY INEQUALITY AND SCHOOLING
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GRAPH 5
OPPORTUNITY INEQUALITY AND EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES
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missing13), while in the right panel we have considered the
incidence of public expenditure on gross domestic product.14 In
both cases, we show that greater resources invested in education
reduce IO. However, we must recall that these are just simple
correlations, which may be reflecting spurious correlation. If we
use OLS regressions, including the absolute level of inequality as
a sort of country control, we find that among this first group of
variables related to schooling, only the share of students in
vocational education comes out slightly significant (see Table 3).
Then let us move to labour market institutions (Graph 6).
Here data availability, especially for new entrants in the EU, is
scarce. We have considered two indirect measures of the degree
of institutionalisation: the presence of union (proxied by union
membership over dependent employment15) and the degree of
employment protection, computed by OECD16. In accordance with
the literature, we expected that when the labour market is heavily
regulated, wages are less related to individual features, since
unions press for job-related pay scales. In addition, employment
protection reduces labour turnover, reducing individual income
variability (and therefore aggregate wage inequality). Both
measures have been proved to reduce total income inequality in
the aggregate (Checchi and Garcia Peñalosa, 2008). However
labour market institutions are only weakly and negatively
correlated with IO, as it can also be seen in OLS regressions (see
again Table 3).
Eventually, we have considered the role of welfare provisions.
283
13 Also from Eurostat 2005. The pupil-teacher ratio is calculated by dividing
the number of full-time equivalent pupils by the number of full-time equivalent
teachers teaching at ISCED level 1. Only teachers in service (including special
education teachers) are taken into account.
14 Also from Eurostat 2005. This indicator is defined as total public expenditure
on education, expressed as a percentage of GDP. Generally, the public sector funds
education either by bearing directly the current and capital expenses of educational
institutions or by supporting students and their families with scholarships and
public loans as well as by transferring public subsidies for educational activities
to private firms or non-profit organisations. Both types of transactions together
are reported as total public expenditure on education.
15 Data were kindly made available by Jelle Visser (University of Amsterdam).
16 It is the index of overall Employment Protection Legislation (version 2),
referred to 2003 (OECD, 2004).
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In general we do not have apriori theoretical expectation on their
impact onto IO, since taxes and subsidies aim to contain income
inequality (through taxation) and to provide income insurance
against unforeseeable events (through subsidies), but in no case
they include compensatory measures which attenuate the impact
of circumstances. However, as long as fiscal redistribution sustains
low incomes (that may be correlated to disadvantaged conditions),
we could find some negative correlation with IO. We have selected
two proxies for the welfare state, which are shown in Graph 7. In
the left panel we have computed the ratio between the Gini index
computed over gross incomes and the Gini index computed over
disposable incomes: the larger is the ratio, the stronger is the
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TABLE 3
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF
INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY - OLS
enrolment in preprimary over primary –0.0511
[0.78]
0.0014
[1.77]*
expenditure in education/gdp –0.0082
[0.90]
pupil/teacher ratio in primary school 0.0039
[1.38]
union density rate –0.0003
[0.22]
OECD employment protection legislation –0.0086
[0.41]
gini before/after tax and transfer –0.0889
[1.14]
expenditure in social protection/gdp 0.0028
[1.42]
Observations 20 23 17 17
R-squared 0.21 0.11 0.02 0.2
Log likelihood 35.94 37.61 27.86 31.44
Note: Robust t statistics in brackets – * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%. Total inequality and constant added as controls.
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GRAPH 6
OPPORTUNITY INEQUALITY
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GRAPH 7
OPPORTUNITY INEQUALITY AND FISCAL REDISTRIBUTION
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redistributive role of the state.17 We find a slightly negative
correlation, which however does not reach statistical significance.
More surprising is the right panel, which exhibits the scatter plot
of IO against social expenditure.18 In such a case we find a positive
correlation with IO, as if a targeted expenditure may reinforce the
income generating impact of circumstances. In both cases
however the coefficients of these variables in multivariate
regressions do not achieve statistical significance.
4. - Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented an approach to measuring
inequality of opportunities based on the identification of
circumstances, which are out of responsibility of the individual.
We have made explicit assumptions, which are necessary to
validate our proposed measure, both parametrically and not. We
have then applied these methods to European countries, providing
alternative country rankings. We show that standard income
inequality and inequality of opportunities do not necessarily offer
the same type of rankings. We have also searched for potential
correlation with the most favourable institutional environment
with respect to maximising EOp. Our results suggest that equality
of opportunity is positively correlated with pre-primary education
and de-tracked secondary school systems. Some correlation is also
found for labour market regulation (namely with union density
and EPL), while we find some counterintuitive result when
considering social expenditure.
We would like to search for more robust results with respect
to the role of institutions. However this requires to move to
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17 Data are from the OECD database (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?
DataSetCode=INEQUALITY) and are referred to mid-2000.
18 From Eurostat, 2005: Expenditure on social protection contains: social
benefits, which consist of transfers, in cash or in kind, to households and individuals
to relieve them of the burden of a defined set of risks or needs; administration
costs, which represent the costs charged to the scheme for its management and
administration; other expenditure, which consists of miscellaneous expenditure by
social protection schemes (payment of property income and other).
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structural model estimation, where through interactions with
circumstances we may exploit temporal and cross-country
variations in order to be able to assess the contribution of the
institutional set-up to income formation. But this is left to future
research.
287
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TABLE 4
TAX RATE IN DENMARK
Taxable income in euro tax rate
0-3,250 0
3,251-6,500 13.3
6,501-9,750 19.2
9,751-13,000 24.1
13,001-16,250 27.6
16,251-19,500 28.7
19,501-26,000 30.4
26,001-32,500 32.7
32,501-39,000 34.5
39,001-45,500 36.2
45,501-52,000 38.9
52,001-65,000 42.3
65,001-97,500 48.4
97,501-130,000 53
130,001 59.2
Source: www.skm.dk.
TABLE 5
TAX RATE IN FINLAND
Taxable income in euro tax rate
12,200-17,000 9
17,001- 20,000 14
20,001- 32,800 19.5
32,801- 58,200 25
58,201 32.5
Source: www.vero.fi.
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TABLE 6
TAX RATE IN HUNGARY
Taxable income in euro tax rate
1-5,960 18
5,961 38
Source: www.worldwide-tax.com.
TABLE 7
TAX RATE IN THE NETHERLANDS
Taxable income in euro tax rate
1-16,265 0
16,266-29,543 7.95
29,544-50,652 42
50,653 52
Source: OECD.
TABLE 8
TAX RATE IN NORWAY
Taxable income in NOK tax rate
lower limit tax rate
0 0.0
29,600-43,022 25.0
43,023-65,999 7.8
66,000-102,580 35.8
102,581-185,160 27.1
185,161-380,999 35.8
381,000-799,999 47.8
800,000 51.3
Source: www.Taxnorway.no.
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TABLE 9
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON MAIN INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
country m(x) sd(x) female foreign notdensely m(age) sd(age ) education N
pop 1 2 3 
AT 18,237 8941 45.0 11.6 70.5 43.4 7.9 0.69 0.31 4,256
BE 21,310 12,343 44.4 10.8 49.1 43.2 7.9 0.006 0.525 0.169 3,601
DE 19,508 9,999 54.1 4.8 56.1 44.2 7.5 0.49 0.51 8,296
DK 19,601 8,206 50.2 3.6 67.2 44.1 8.5 0.65 0.35 2,796
EE 3,807 2,847 54.6 14.2 69.4 44.3 8.2 0.59 0.41 3,730
ES 14,062 8,052 41.3 6.2 50.9 42.7 8.3 0.67 0.33 10,012
FI 20,915 10,178 49.3 1.9 76.9 44.9 8.5 0.60 0.40 4,535
FR 19,368 10,099 48.3 10.9 56.0 43.6 8.2 0.67 0.33 7,164
GR 13,870 8,698 36.9 8.7 60.2 43.0 8.4 0.70 0.30 3,980
HU 4,353 4,934 47.1 2.5 63.6 43.4 8.5 0.001 0.797 0.202 4,591
IE 23,938 12,545 45.5 11.6 62.7 44.2 8.2 0.57 0.43 4,072
IS 20,466 10,001 50.2 4.9 42.9 42.7 8.6 0.97 0.03 1,248
IT 18,654 13,943 42.1 5.8 64.9 43.1 8.1 0.005 0.774 0.221 17,151
LT 3,022 2,301 53.0 6.4 54.7 44.6 7.9 0.38 0.62 3,659
LU 30,034 14,482 43.6 50.6 54.0 41.5 8.1 0.69 0.31 2,498
LV 2,871 2,062 54.4 15.7 49.9 43.8 8.3 0.002 0.639 0.359 2,706
NL 18,198 8,768 45.2 5.1 43.5 8.3 0.61 0.39 8,441
NO 19,809 9,403 48.7 6.8 50.6 43.8 8.5 0.001 0.596 0.403 5,674
PL 3,690 2,547 45.9 0.3 60.2 42.9 7.8 0.003 0.752 0.246 10,347
PT 8,997 6,199 45.5 2.4 64.4 43.2 8.4 0.88 0.12 3,375
SE 19,453 8,256 49.4 9.9 81.5 44.5 8.9 0.57 0.43 2,435
SI 95,57 4,117 48.6 11.3 42.4 7.9 0.78 0.22 3,011
SK 3,748 3,146 48.8 2.0 71.0 43.8 8.0 0.80 0.20 4,461
UK 23,861 13,872 50.9 8.7 26.7 44.0 8.6 0.55 0.45 5,421
Total 15,129 11,911 46.7 7.4 59.5 43.48 8.21 0.003 0.752 0.246 127,460
The columns of this table show the following statistics: 1. average post tax individual income;
2. post tax individual income standard deviation; 3. percentage of females; 4. percentage of
foreigners; 5. percentage of individuals not living in a densely populated area; 6. average age;
7. age standard deviation; 8. percentage of individuals with no education; 9. percentage of
individuals with primary or secondary school degree; 10. percentage of individuals with higher
degree; 11. number of observations.
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TABLE 10
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON MAIN PARENTAL VARIABLES
country occupation N education N
1 2 3 1 2 3
AT 0.59 0.32 0.09 3,845 0 0.94 0.06 4,025
BE 0.47 0.25 0.25 2,995 0.11 0.67 0.22 3,601
DE 0.52 0.23 0.25 7,421 0 0.66 0.34 5,296
DK 0.45 0.30 0.22 2,649 0 0.78 0.22 2,796
EE 0.75 0.10 0.15 3,029 0.01 0.72 0.27 3,730
ES 0.60 0.28 0.12 9,496 0.20 0.69 0.11 10,012
FI 0.52 0.32 0.17 3,810 0.03 0.81 0.16 4,535
FR 0.55 0.29 0.16 6,562 0.04 0.86 0.10 7,164
GB 0.35 0.51 0.14 3,817 0.25 0.66 0.09 3,980
HU 0.66 0.22 0.12 3,986 0.00 0.84 0.16 4,591
IE 0.47 0.14 0.39 2,612 0.01 0.83 0.15 2,792
IS 0.35 0.37 0.25 1,053 0 0.76 0.24 1,245
IT 0.55 0.24 0.19 15,562 0.11 0.85 0.04 17,151
LT 0.77 0.11 0.12 3,170 0.05 0.69 0.26 3,659
LU 0.55 0.23 0.22 2,365 0.06 0.76 0.18 2,495
LV 0.77 0.10 0.13 2,104 0.02 0.77 0.21 2,706
NL 0.39 0.20 0.41 3,534 0 0.83 0.17 3,866
NO 0.45 0.31 0.24 2,519 0 0.58 0.42 2,752
PL 0.53 0.36 0.11 9,377 0.11 0.80 0.09 10,347
PT 0.61 0.31 0.08 3,057 0.35 0.61 0.03 3,375
SE 0.50 0.29 0.21 535 0.01 0.79 0.20 2,435
SI 0.61 0.27 0.11 2,623 0.04 0.87 0.09 3,011
SK 0.72 0.14 0.14 4,070 0 0.90 0.10 4,461
UK 0.62 0.24 0.13 2,750 0.50 0.16 0.34 5,421
Total 0.57 0.26 0.17 103,001 0.10 0.75 0.15 118,452
The columns of this table show the following statistics: 1. percentage of individuals who have
at least one of the parents occupied in the categories 8,000 and 9,000 of the ISCO88
classification; 2. percentage of individuals who have at least one of the parents occupied in
categories from 5,000 to 7,000 of the ISCO88 classification; 3. percentage of individuals who
have at least one of the parents occupied in categories 1,000 to 4,000 of the ISCO88
classification (see the text for further details); 4. number of observations available for the
parental occupation variable; 5. percentage of individuals who have both parents with no
education; 6. percentage of individuals who have at least one of the parents with primary or
secondary school degree; 7. percentage of individuals who have at least one of the parents
with post-secondary or higher degree; 8. number of observations available for the parental
education variable.
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